Malware Analysis Report: ASEAN Notes.iso from Mustang Panda Campaign

Executive Summary

The ASEAN Notes.iso file is a component of a Mustang Panda campaign targeting entities in Myanmar. The attack leverages DLL sideloading via a hijacked Microsoft GetCurrentRollback.exe process (renamed office.exe) to execute the malicious GetCurrentDeploy.dll. The malware establishes persistence through registry modification and attempts C2 communication with fallback infrastructure. Primary objectives include initial access, persistence, and command execution, with suspected espionage motivations.

Case Details

File Metadata

File NameASEAN Notes.iso
File Size602,112 B
File TypeISO 9660
MD59832bd120aa506758b3c1850dc2f7e41
SHA18e7dfe85c00f76c2525b0ea001b735b1240f3342
SHA256a00673e35eaccf494977f4e9a957d5820a20fe6b589c796f9085a0271e8c380c
Created TimeN/A
File NameGetCurrentDeploy.dll
File Size97,792 B
File TypeLinker: Microsoft Linker(14.34**)[DLL32]
MD5d901af6c326d9d6934d818beef214e81
SHA1b78e786091f017510b44137961f3074fe7d5f950
SHA25651d89afe0a49a3abf88ed6f032e4f0a83949fc44489fc7b45c860020f905c9d7
Created Time16/1/2024 11:27:46 PM
File Nameoffice.exe
File Size73,344 B
File TypePE32
MD5823ce97af76ce9321f8ca58f126b3141
SHA1aad6f04d8e4a511eb518df3c07a2094c8b558708
SHA2560d0981941cf9f1021b07b7578c45ed4c623edb16ad03a256c4cd9aaf900d723d
Created Time16/1/2024 11:27:44 PM
File NameASEAN 2024.lnk Mofa memo.lnk MS.lnk NS.lnk
File Size1200
File TypeMS Windows shortcut
MD5698382d42978ee9b86046682cacc76ab
SHA1dd149a0c4a650df907557b3c0219fde81d339d11
SHA256e537c5da268c6a08d6e94d570e8efb17d0ca3f4013e221fadc4e0b3191499767
Created TimeN/A

Case Specific Requirement

Machine

  • Windows Environment

Tools

  • hashmyfiles
  • PEStudio
  • DiffView
  • RegShot
  • Wireshark
  • DirWatch

Static Analysis

ASEAN Notes.iso

image

34/61 security vendors flagged this file as malicious.

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Associated with Mustang Panda targeting Myanmar

When mounting the ISO file, the victim is shown a set of LNK files or Shortcut and a folder with numerous structure named _

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All of the LNK files are programmed to display PDF icon. Each of the LNK / Shortcut has the same properties/command which is

C:\Windows\System32\ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript _\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\office.exe

The _ folder structure:

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At the end of folder _ there are office.exe and GetCurrentDeploy.dll.

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office.exe

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No security vendors flagged this file as malicious. However office.exe is not the real name of this file.

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GetCurrentRollback.exe is the original name and it is a legitmate file associated with Microsoft Corporation. Why does the LNK file execute a legitimate file? DLL-Side Loading is the current assumption that can be made.

GetCurrentDeploy.dll

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49/72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

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11//77 Windows API being used flaged as malicious

Can be confirmed that DLL-Side Loading attack is being used. office.exe or GetCurrentRollback.exe might be using a shared library or DLL named GetCurrentDeploy.dll. The nature of importing functions from a shared library is to locate the file in a specific order. For windows this is the searching order:

  1. The directory from which the application loaded
  2. The system directory
  3. The 16-bit system directory
  4. The Windows directory
  5. The current working directory (CWD)
  6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable

Knowing the office.exe and GetCurrentDeploy.dll is in the same folder indicates DLL-Side Loading attack is being used.

reference: https://techzone.bitdefender.com/en/tech-explainers/what-is-dll-sideloading.html

Key Findings

  • Victim will be tricked into mounting the ISO file and click one of the LNK file
  • The LNK file will execute C:\Windows\System32\ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript _\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\office.exe
  • The file office.exe using GetCurrentDeploy.dll as shared library
  • Malicious code is executed within the context of a legitimate application using DLL Side Loading method

Attack Visualization

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Dynamic Analysis

Network Analysis

Clicking on one of the LNK files will execute C:\Windows\System32\ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript _\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\office.exe. Right off executing it, the malware will try to communicate with its C2, openservername.com with IP 103.159.132.80.

DNS request for openservername.com image

Malware trying to communicate with the C2, but unfortunately the C2 is down.

image Upon multiple failed request, the malware switch into another C2 server with IP 37.120.222.19

image This C2 is also down. After failed attempts to communicate with the C2 servers, the malware killed itself image However upon execution, the malware replicate itself into C:\Users\Public\ directory

image

Persistence

The malware established a persistence under the registry gameestrto with command line argument StarWegameToyOU at under \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ Key.

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The Run key makes a program run every time a user logs on.

Execution Flow

  1. LNK Activation: Triggers ScriptRunner.exe to execute office.exe from the nested _ directories.

  2. DLL Hijacking: office.exe loads GetCurrentDeploy.dll from its directory (DLL search order abuse).

  3. Persistence: Copies itself to C:\Users\Public\office.exe and adds registry autorun entry.

  4. C2 Communication:

    • Primary C2: openservername.com (103.159.132.80)

    • Fallback C2: 37.120.222.19

  5. Self-Termination: Exits if C2s are unreachable.

Key Technical Findings

  1. DLL Sideloading Technique:

    • Legitimate Process: GetCurrentRollback.exe (Microsoft-signed).

    • Malicious DLL: GetCurrentDeploy.dll (unsigned, high entropy sections).

  2. Persistence Mechanism:

    • Registry: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\gameestrto"C:\Users\Public\office.exe".
  3. C2 Resilience: Dual C2 infrastructure with failover logic.

Full Malware Events

image

IOC

IOCType
ASEAN Notes.iso (SHA256)a00673e35eaccf494977f4e9a957d5820a20fe6b589c796f9085a0271e8c380c
ASEAN 2024.lnk, NS.lnk, MS.lnk, Mofa memo.lnk (SHA256)e537c5da268c6a08d6e94d570e8efb17d0ca3f4013e221fadc4e0b3191499767
office.exe (SHA256)0d0981941cf9f1021b07b7578c45ed4c623edb16ad03a256c4cd9aaf900d723d
GetCurrentDeploy.dll (SHA256)51d89afe0a49a3abf88ed6f032e4f0a83949fc44489fc7b45c860020f905c9d7
Primary C2 IP address103.159.132.80
Backup C2 IP address37.120.222.19
C2 Domainopenservername.com
Autorun keygameestrto
StringStarWegameToyOU

Reference

https://www.spyshelter.com/exe/microsoft-corporation-getcurrentrollback-exe/ https://csirt-cti.net/2024/01/23/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar/ https://techzone.bitdefender.com/en/tech-explainers/what-is-dll-sideloading.html https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys