Malware Analysis Report: ASEAN Notes.iso from Mustang Panda Campaign
Author: Capang
Date: 24-01-2025
Analysis Environment: Windows 10 VM
Associated Campaign: Mustang Panda ASEAN Notes.iso
Ref: https://csirt-cti.net/2024/01/23/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar/
Executive Summary
The ASEAN Notes.iso file is a component of a Mustang Panda campaign targeting entities in Myanmar. The attack leverages DLL sideloading via a hijacked Microsoft GetCurrentRollback.exe process (renamed office.exe) to execute the malicious GetCurrentDeploy.dll. The malware establishes persistence through registry modification and attempts C2 communication with fallback infrastructure. Primary objectives include initial access, persistence, and command execution, with suspected espionage motivations.
Case Details
File Metadata
File Name | ASEAN Notes.iso |
---|---|
File Size | 602,112 B |
File Type | ISO 9660 |
MD5 | 9832bd120aa506758b3c1850dc2f7e41 |
SHA1 | 8e7dfe85c00f76c2525b0ea001b735b1240f3342 |
SHA256 | a00673e35eaccf494977f4e9a957d5820a20fe6b589c796f9085a0271e8c380c |
Created Time | N/A |
File Name | GetCurrentDeploy.dll |
---|---|
File Size | 97,792 B |
File Type | Linker: Microsoft Linker(14.34**)[DLL32] |
MD5 | d901af6c326d9d6934d818beef214e81 |
SHA1 | b78e786091f017510b44137961f3074fe7d5f950 |
SHA256 | 51d89afe0a49a3abf88ed6f032e4f0a83949fc44489fc7b45c860020f905c9d7 |
Created Time | 16/1/2024 11:27:46 PM |
File Name | office.exe |
---|---|
File Size | 73,344 B |
File Type | PE32 |
MD5 | 823ce97af76ce9321f8ca58f126b3141 |
SHA1 | aad6f04d8e4a511eb518df3c07a2094c8b558708 |
SHA256 | 0d0981941cf9f1021b07b7578c45ed4c623edb16ad03a256c4cd9aaf900d723d |
Created Time | 16/1/2024 11:27:44 PM |
File Name | ASEAN 2024.lnk Mofa memo.lnk MS.lnk NS.lnk |
---|---|
File Size | 1200 |
File Type | MS Windows shortcut |
MD5 | 698382d42978ee9b86046682cacc76ab |
SHA1 | dd149a0c4a650df907557b3c0219fde81d339d11 |
SHA256 | e537c5da268c6a08d6e94d570e8efb17d0ca3f4013e221fadc4e0b3191499767 |
Created Time | N/A |
Case Specific Requirement
Machine
- Windows Environment
Tools
- hashmyfiles
- PEStudio
- DiffView
- RegShot
- Wireshark
- DirWatch
Static Analysis
ASEAN Notes.iso
34/61 security vendors flagged this file as malicious.
Associated with Mustang Panda targeting Myanmar
When mounting the ISO file, the victim is shown a set of LNK
files or Shortcut and a folder with numerous structure named _
All of the LNK
files are programmed to display PDF icon. Each of the LNK
/ Shortcut has the same properties/command which is
C:\Windows\System32\ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript _\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\office.exe
The _
folder structure:
At the end of folder _
there are office.exe
and GetCurrentDeploy.dll
.
office.exe
No security vendors flagged this file as malicious. However office.exe
is not the real name of this file.
GetCurrentRollback.exe
is the original name and it is a legitmate file associated with Microsoft Corporation. Why does the LNK
file execute a legitimate file? DLL-Side Loading is the current assumption that can be made.
GetCurrentDeploy.dll
49/72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious
11//77 Windows API being used flaged as malicious
Can be confirmed that DLL-Side Loading attack is being used. office.exe
or GetCurrentRollback.exe
might be using a shared library or DLL named GetCurrentDeploy.dll
. The nature of importing functions from a shared library is to locate the file in a specific order. For windows this is the searching order:
- The directory from which the application loaded
- The system directory
- The 16-bit system directory
- The Windows directory
- The current working directory (CWD)
- The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable
Knowing the office.exe
and GetCurrentDeploy.dll
is in the same folder indicates DLL-Side Loading attack is being used.
reference: https://techzone.bitdefender.com/en/tech-explainers/what-is-dll-sideloading.html
Key Findings
- Victim will be tricked into mounting the
ISO
file and click one of theLNK
file - The
LNK
file will executeC:\Windows\System32\ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript _\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\office.exe
- The file
office.exe
usingGetCurrentDeploy.dll
as shared library - Malicious code is executed within the context of a legitimate application using DLL Side Loading method
Attack Visualization
Dynamic Analysis
Network Analysis
Clicking on one of the LNK
files will execute C:\Windows\System32\ScriptRunner.exe -appvscript _\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\office.exe
. Right off executing it, the malware will try to communicate with its C2, openservername.com
with IP 103.159.132.80
.
DNS request for openservername.com
Malware trying to communicate with the C2, but unfortunately the C2 is down.
Upon multiple failed request, the malware switch into another C2 server with IP 37.120.222.19
This C2 is also down. After failed attempts to communicate with the C2 servers, the malware killed itself
However upon execution, the malware replicate itself into
C:\Users\Public\
directory
Persistence
The malware established a persistence under the registry gameestrto
with command line argument StarWegameToyOU
at under \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
Key.
The Run key makes a program run every time a user logs on.
Execution Flow
LNK Activation: Triggers
ScriptRunner.exe
to executeoffice.exe
from the nested_
directories.DLL Hijacking:
office.exe
loadsGetCurrentDeploy.dll
from its directory (DLL search order abuse).Persistence: Copies itself to
C:\Users\Public\office.exe
and adds registry autorun entry.C2 Communication:
Primary C2:
openservername.com
(103.159.132.80)Fallback C2:
37.120.222.19
Self-Termination: Exits if C2s are unreachable.
Key Technical Findings
DLL Sideloading Technique:
Legitimate Process:
GetCurrentRollback.exe
(Microsoft-signed).Malicious DLL:
GetCurrentDeploy.dll
(unsigned, high entropy sections).
Persistence Mechanism:
- Registry:
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\gameestrto
→"C:\Users\Public\office.exe"
.
- Registry:
C2 Resilience: Dual C2 infrastructure with failover logic.
Full Malware Events
IOC
IOC | Type |
---|---|
ASEAN Notes.iso (SHA256) | a00673e35eaccf494977f4e9a957d5820a20fe6b589c796f9085a0271e8c380c |
ASEAN 2024.lnk, NS.lnk, MS.lnk, Mofa memo.lnk (SHA256) | e537c5da268c6a08d6e94d570e8efb17d0ca3f4013e221fadc4e0b3191499767 |
office.exe (SHA256) | 0d0981941cf9f1021b07b7578c45ed4c623edb16ad03a256c4cd9aaf900d723d |
GetCurrentDeploy.dll (SHA256) | 51d89afe0a49a3abf88ed6f032e4f0a83949fc44489fc7b45c860020f905c9d7 |
Primary C2 IP address | 103.159.132.80 |
Backup C2 IP address | 37.120.222.19 |
C2 Domain | openservername.com |
Autorun key | gameestrto |
String | StarWegameToyOU |
Reference
https://www.spyshelter.com/exe/microsoft-corporation-getcurrentrollback-exe/ https://csirt-cti.net/2024/01/23/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar/ https://techzone.bitdefender.com/en/tech-explainers/what-is-dll-sideloading.html https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys